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Germany and the United States are divided by many things, among them a “flag
enigma” (Ute Krüdewagen). The enigma is this: on the one hand, most Americans
venerate and adore their flag, but their Constitution affords it no special protection;
on the other hand, the German Basic Law grants special status to a flag (and
other state symbols) that most Germans regard with comparative indifference or
even skepticism. Thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled that
lawmakers cannot prohibit burning the American flag in protest (Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)). Almost
simultaneously, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that lawmakers
can protect national symbols but must do so with appropriate regard to expressive
values. Thus emboldened, German law continues to criminalize disparaging,
defamatory treatment of certain national icons – including, perhaps especially, the
national flag (§ 90(a) of the German Criminal Code).
According to news reports, Germany’s governing “grand coalition” now wants
to extend protected status to the flags of other nations as well. (Until now, other
nations’ flags were protected only when employed for official or ceremonial
purposes.) The proposal was prompted by December 2017 protests in Berlin,
at which demonstrators burned the Israeli flag in defiance of Donald Trump’s
recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Many Germans were appalled – not
least because burning Israel’s flag strikes some as a denial of Israel’s right to exist
and others as a proxy for anti-Semitism. The coalition originally planned to protect
only Israel’s flag. But the Israeli embassy preferred that Israel not be singled out.
Accordingly, the proposal covers the whole planet – from China and Chile to Saudi
Arabia and South Africa. Oddly enough, the Stars and Stripes might soon enjoy
more protection in Germany than in the United States.
It is not entirely clear what one should make of this curious possibility. It is rather
clearer that, if the proposal becomes law, it likely won’t – and shouldn’t – survive
judicial scrutiny.
A logic of Vergangenheitspolitik
In quashing Gregory Johnson’s conviction for burning the American flag, the
Supreme Court (per Brennan J) famously highlighted the “bedrock principle”
of American speech law, namely that “the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable” (491 U.S. 397 at 414). The challenged law intentionally restricted
speech, the majority found, and it did so on the basis of the speech’s content. Such
content-based restrictions, Justice Brennan explained, must survive “the most
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exacting scrutiny” (491 U.S. 397 at 412). This usually means, in practice, that they
don’t survive at all.
As is well known, German constitutional jurisprudence has been less categorical in
condemning content-based restrictions. The Basic Law allows limitations grounded
in general laws, the protection of youth, and the right of personal honor. The German
Constitutional Court has carved out additional exceptions. But I don’t think any of
these exceptions cover the proposed flags amendment. The Court’s exceptions
are united by a logic of Vergangenheitspolitik that has no bearing the coalition’s
proposal.
Take, for instance, three leading cases that accommodate content-based
restrictions: the National Flag case of 1990, the Holocaust Denial case of 1994, and
the Wunsiedel case from 2009.
In the National Flag case, the Court overturned the convictions of those involved
in producing and distributing a photo-montage in which a male figure was depicted
sending a stream of urine down onto a federal flag being used in a military
ceremony. The Court ruled that the lower court failed to recognize the montage’s
status as art and hadn’t construed it in a way that did justice to expressive values.
The collage was a work of satire, the justices said, and its message was mainly
anti-militarist, not anti-democratic. It did not defame the State as such, nor did it
attack the foundations of the constitutional order. At the same time, however, the
Court ruled that the constitution did allow the State to protect its symbols. The Court
explained that permissive posture by pointing to such symbols’ power to promote
societal integration and foster citizen fealty (para. 51). But that logic, whatever its
intrinsic merits, surely cannot justify protecting the symbols of other states.
In the Holocaust Denial case, the Court upheld local authorities’ decision to
ban a gathering at which the infamous David Irving was likely to deny that the
Holocaust happened. In doing so, the justices made two important moves. First,
they distinguished between expressions of opinion and assertions of fact (paras.
26 et seq.). Demonstrably false factual assertions do not, they explained, help
shape public opinion and do not, therefore, enjoy constitutional protection (para.
28). What’s more, opinions formed on the basis of bogus facts are of limited (or
no) constitutional value. The Court’s second move was to rule that denying the
Holocaust defamed Jews as a group and therefore seriously offended the personality
rights of individual Jews (para. 46).
Neither of these moves supports the proposal to protect all flags. Defiling a flag
asserts no facts. One could perhaps argue that by defacing a country’s flag one
defames its citizens. But I take the Court’s point in the Holocaust Denial case to
be that the authorities were justified in protecting the personality rights of German
citizens (who happened to be Jews). It’s not clear that the same logic would or
should apply to non-resident foreign nationals, to resident foreign nationals, or even
to German citizens with ties to the countries whose flags might be disfigured. In any
case, I suspect that the Holocaust Denial decision was informed by the justices’
sense of societal defamation – by the notion that to deny the Holocaust is to offend
profoundly the State’s fundamental values (cf. Neville Cox, pp. 750-755). That
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sense, of course, is shaped by history and memory in a manner not present in the
case of foreign flags.
The centrality of history and memory was more explicit in the Court’s Wunsiedel
judgment of 2009. In that case, authorities banned a memorial march meant to
honor Hitler’s Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess. The ban was based on a 2005 law that
criminalized public approval, celebration, or justification of Nazi misrule. The law
was a textbook example of content-based restriction. But even though the Court
explained that such content-specific sanctions (the Court called them Sonderrechte)
were not “general laws” for purposes of Article 5(2) GG, the justices nonetheless
held that this content-based restriction was permissible for reasons of historical
memory and in the name of mastering the past. The entire Basic Law, the justices
explained, including Article 5, was conceived as an aversive response – a “counter
proposal” (Gegenentwurf) – to National Socialism (para. 65). From top to bottom,
in its overarching structure and its minutest details, the Basic Law aimed “to learn
from historical experiences and to preclude once and for all any repetition of such
injustice” (para. 65). In light of this overarching purpose, to celebrate Nazi history
or to champion Nazi ideology was to attack the constitutional order at its core.
The State’s need to defend against such attacks justified an exception to general
principles of free speech law. But, to repeat: this logic has nothing to do with a ban
on burning foreign flags.
A potentially disastrous transformation of German
free speech law
All three of these cases justified some content-based restrictions by pointing,
expressly or impliedly, to the German past. In that respect, all three judgments
evince the gravitational pull of militant democracy – the need to protect the liberal-
democratic order, even through illiberal means, against erosion from within. And
militant democracy is motivated, in Germany, by the memory of Weimar’s collapse
and of Nazism’s crimes.
There are, of course, those who find this logic of Vergangenheitspolitik increasingly
unpersuasive (see, eg, Florian Meinel, p. 289). My point is not to defend or dispute
that logic. It is only to suggest that the logic is entirely irrelevant to the current
proposal to protect every flag under the sun. That might be different if, as originally
planned, the law were limited to protecting Israel’s flag. Even then, the logic would
be less than straightforward. As it stands, and if I may be pardoned for dropping into
American parlance, the proposal is either impermissibly content-based, outrageously
overbroad, or both. In an American setting, it would be constitutionally dead on
arrival. But even by the laxer terms of German jurisprudence, the proposal to
protect all the flags could be upheld only by drastically – and I think disastrously
– transforming German law on the freedom of speech. As Justice Brennan might
have put it (or Justice Brandeis before him), the proper response to those who defile
foreign flags “is to persuade them that they are wrong” (491 U.S. 397 at 419).
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